We investigate the cost of business cycle uncertainty (lack of firm knowledge about the prevailing state of the economy) in a setup where the economy switches between booms and recessions at random intervals (Hamilton, 1989) . Calibrating an exchange economy model to match the properties of the postwar US data, we find that giving consumers additional information beyond that already contained in the endowment growth rates yields only moderate gains. In a second stage, we investigate the effect of non-perfect information processing in this setting. Surprisingly, we find that opting for slow learning might yield large utility gains, especially for consumers with a strong preference for early resolution of uncertainty.
1 Introduction "I would far rather be ignorant than wise in the foreboding of evil." (AEschylus).
News announcements that can be used to gauge the state of the economy are amongst the most keenly surveyed by financial markets participants, and it is well known that such announcements move prices in both fixed-income and equity markets (Andersen et al., 2003; Kliesen and Schmid, 2006) . This is not restricted to forward looking measures such as consumer confidence surveys, but also holds for data which pertains to past equilibria, such as employment numbers, inflation, or GDP estimates.
This points to considerable uncertainty, not only on future economic developments, but also on the prevailing state of the economy. It seems reasonable to ask what the aggregate cost of this uncertainty is. Or, what is the aggregate welfare gain of providing research that reduces such risk? As far as we are aware, such questions has not found a place in the economic research yet.
In contrast, the related topic of the cost of business-cycle fluctuations per se has received considerable attention. In an influential contribution, Lucas (1987) measured the cost of the business cycle by computing the equivalent reduction in consumption that a representative consumer would accept to eliminate any deviation from the trend. The magnitude turned out to be in the order of 0.1% of annual consumption. To arrive at this estimate, he assumed a linear trend consumption growth rate and power utility preferences of consumers.
To evaluate the cost of business cycle uncertainty, we need to relax both assumptions:
Our main question cannot be properly addressed using a power utility function, since the expected utility theory effectively maintains that agents are indifferent about the timing of resolution of risk. Instead, we use the generalized utility function proposed by Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989) , more commonly known as Epstein-Zin preferences. The extension to non-expected utility functions is a natural one and has been widely adopted in the cost of business cycle literature (e.g. in Obstfeld, 1994; Pemberton, 1996; Dolmas, 1998; and Tallarini (2000) ). Also, it cannot be addressed within the standard, linear models used in most business cycle research. Instead, we use a regime-switching model as pioneered by Hamilton (1989) .
Our concern is different from the rich literature on the value of information (see e.g. Gollier, 2001; chapters 24-26) . This literature deals with the value of receiving information which can be acted on to make a profit. From the perspective of firms or consumers, better information on the state of the economy can translate into tangible gains through better informed decision making or other channels. We will not look at such effects, but focus on the subjective costs incurred by consumers from late resolution of uncertainty.
The subjective benefit of knowing the current state of the economy is that it enables consumers to better forecast their future consumption levels. If, as both microeconomic studies and financial market data indicates (see section 4), consumers have a preference for early resolution of uncertainty, then better forecasts translates in lower uncertainty.
Using a model where agents have a strong preference for early resolution of uncertainty, we find that the benefits from removing any doubt about the state of the economy are quite modest. To some extent this seem to explain why the general public, unlike financial market professionals, does not seem to be very well informed about the state of the economy, even to the extent of making flawed economic decisions. As Chauvet and Hamilton (2005) notes [...] the widespread belief by the American public that the U.S. was still in recession in 2003 may have played a role in tax cuts approved by the U.S. Congress, the outcome of a special election for the governor of California, and a host of other policy and planning decisions by government bodies, private firms, and individual households.
Throughout the main parts of our paper, we assume that consumers are Bayesian learners, but the low benefits we find of providing them with better information begs the question what would be the result if agents would employ a different learning mechanism. In the last part of our paper, we attempt a first look at this question by computing the utility level of a consumer who chooses an extremely slow speed of learning: never updating his state beliefs at all. As it turns out, such consumers could actually achieve significantly higher utility levels than Bayesian learners. This effect is stronger the higher their preference for early resolution of uncertainty. This is quite striking, since such slow learners are facing the highest amount of short term consumption uncertainty. We link this result to the cyclical properties of the stochastic discount factor in our model. The paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces the general model and explains consumers learning about the economy, section 3 provides an overview of the data and estimation of the model, and in section 4 we proceed to choose the preference parameters. Results for the standard model are presented and discussed in section 5, while in section 6 we look at slow learning. Section 7 concludes.
Basic framework
We adopt a variation of Lucas' (1978) exchange economy. The log growth rate of the completely perishable endowment good c is given by
where the mean growth rate µ fluctuates with the state of the economy s t ; σ denotes its volatility and ǫ t is an i.i.d. standard normal innovation. The state of the economy is not directly observable by agents, but the realized growth rates provides some information on it. We restrict the economy to be in either a state 1, a high growth (boom) state or in state 2, a low growth (recession) state. The time independent transition probabilities between the two states are given by
with i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i θ ij = 1. The economy is populated by a continuum of agents whose utility can be represented by Epstein-Zin's preferences
Where
The parameter γ is the Arrow-Pratt Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA); ψ represents the Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution (EIS); and β measures the subjective time discount rate under certainty. The function reduces to a monotone transformation of the standard power utility function for ψ = γ −1 . As Kocherlakota (1990) shows, consumers whose EIS is larger than the inverse of their CRRA will prefer to have uncertainty resolved as early as possible while the opposite holds for those whose EIS is smaller than the 
inverse of their CRRA. This is illustrated in figure 2: both trees depicted in the figure have two alternative paths, both with a consumption of c 0 and c 1 in the first two periods and then a consumption of either c 2 or c 2 in the last period. The only difference between the two trees is that in the one on the left hand side, consumers learn their period 2 consumption already in period 1. A consumer with a relatively high EIS will prefer the tree on the left hand side, since uncertainty about final period consumption is resolved earlier. The way we model consumers' learning in this setting is standard and we will provide only a short account here. For a more thorough treatment we refer to Hamilton (1994) , chapter 22.
Letξ t|t be the vector of inferred (unsmoothed) posterior probabilities of being in each state conditional on the all data available up to time t given complete knowledge about the population parameters, so that the j element of the vector is given byξ
Where Y t is a vector of all data up to time t and Γ contains all the model parameters. Collecting the transition probabilities θ j in the matrix Θ, Bayes' rule implies that optimal forecast and inference for each date t can be found by from the equationsξ
where ⊙ denotes element by element multiplication, 1 is 2 × 1 vector of 1 ones, and η t is the likelihood of observing realized consumption growth rate (and other signals) in each of the two states. When no external signals are available, the j element of η t is given by
Besides the information embedded in the endowment growth rates, consumers may have available additional sources of information for inferring the current state of the economy. We choose to model all these other informations as an independent noisy signal. For convenience, we let this signal take the form:
where ǫ y,t is an i.i.d. white noise term, and 1 {st=1} is an indicator function which equals one if we are in the first state and zero otherwise. The strength of the signal is determined by h ∈ [0, 1]. An h of zero implies that the signal contains no information, while an h of one implies that the signal is strong enough to reveal the state of the economy with certainty. Normalizing the mean of the signal in the recession state to 0, and assuming without loss of generality that the signal has a positive mean in the boom state, the mean that generates a h percent reduction of the probability of making a type I error is given by
where F denotes the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal. The final state beliefs is obtained by computing the joint likelihood of observing both the realized endowment growth rate and the realized external signal in both states
As with equation (7), the likelihood vector is passed through the filter (equation 6) to generate inferred state probabilities.
Data and estimation
We use quarterly US data spanning from 1952:I to 2005:IV to calibrate the model. The variables used in the estimation are mainly from the NIPA tables published on the Bureau of Economic Analysis' website (http://bea.gov/). GDP, as all the other economics series, is expressed in real per capita term. We use two consumption measures: total consumption expenditures (PCE) and consumption of services and non-durables (NDS). In constructing the second consumption series, care was taken to avoid the problems related the addition of chain-weighted series (Whelan, 2002) . The nominal risk-free rate was imputed from the end of quarter average of bid and ask quotes for 3 month treasury bills in the secondary market as reported on the monthly CRSP data base. To arrive at real interest rates, we estimated an AR(1) process for the inflation rate (taken to be the change in the log GDP deflator) and used it to compute expected inflation rates. These were then used to compute the expected real rates from the observed nominal rates. As a cross check we used realized real interest rates (which is equivalent to assuming perfect foresight) and found almost identical results.
Parameter estimates for the regime switching model were obtained by using a Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo (MCMC) procedure on the GDP series. In this, we closely followed the algorithm described in section 9.1 of Kim and Nelson (1999) . Having obtained the estimates of the inferred state probabilities along with the transition matrix based on the GDP series, we estimated the first two moments of consumption series by Maximum Likelihood: to estimate the boom process parameters, the observations were weighted with the smoothed boom probabilities; to estimate the recession process parameters, the observations were weighted with the smoothed recession probabilities. Finally, the reported standard errors were computed from the derivatives of the inverse of the Fisher information matrix. The resulting estimates are given in Table 1 .
Some preliminary intuition on the model economy can be inferred from the regime switching estimation: an important variable for our analysis is the high persistence of both states, especially the boom state. The probabilities of switching from the two states are 6.18% and 23.26%, respectively. These probabilities imply an average duration of 16.2 quarters for booms and 4.3 quarters for recessions. Hence, if we find ourselves in either of the two states, we expect to stay in it for several quarters. The high persistence of the states, coupled with the higher mean growth rates implies that the conditional consumption growth rate is higher in booms than in recessions.
Comparing the estimates on personal consumption expenditures and non durables and services, we found PCE to be more volatile and with a larger spread of the mean growth rate between the two states. This is due to the high cyclicality of durables expenditures. Durables yield a stream of consumption over their lifetime, so durables expenditures does not fit perfectly with our theoretical consumption aggregate. Rather than trying to impute to true durables consumption series (as in e.g. Dunn and Singleton, 1986; Eichenbaum and Hansen, 1990; Ogaki and Reinhart, 1998; or Yogo, 2006) , we choose to report the raw numbers. Our estimated consumption volatilities hence form an upper bound of the true underlying volatility.
On the other hand, the reported numbers for non durables and services are likely to be on the lower end of the true consumption series due to time aggregation issues, and hence form a lower bound on the true volatility of the underlying series (Breeden et al., 1989) .
Parameterization
The main factor determining the cost of business cycle uncertainty is the relative size of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution ψ and the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ.
For our purpose we choose not to rely on standard calibration techniques from business cycle research in the tradition of Kydland and Prescott (1982) , where the model parameters are chosen to match long run aggregate ratios. Especially, a standard calibration for the coefficient γ would be problematic. As Tallarini (2000) forcefully demonstrates, the business cycle predictions are mostly determined by the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
Given the controversies regarding calibration, 1 we use parameter values from the asset-pricing literature for the risk aversion coefficient γ and confirm the estimates found in recent micro studies for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution ψ with empirical financial market data. (See also the discussion in Lucas, 2003.) For the risk aversion parameter γ, we use a benchmark of 25. While this is high in comparison to what is classically used in business cycle research, it is in the middle of the range of what is employed in the asset-pricing literature (see e.g. Campbell and Cochrane, 1999 or Lettau et al., 2006) and far less than what is needed to replicate the empirical equity premium.
As recent research has shown, the intertemporal elasticity parameter is best estimated using disaggregate data. These studies typically find EIS parameters around or above 1. (See Beaudry and van Wincoop, 1996; VissingJørgensen, 2002 .) The most relevant study for our purposes is that by Vissing-Jørgensen and Attanasio (2003) who employ the same Epstein-Zin framework as we do. They find values in the range of 1.17 to 1.75. For the tables which follows, we will mark this range with a gray backdrop.
To further pin down the parameter ψ, we match the predicted fluctuations of the risk-free rate over the business cycle with those in the US data. Regressing our estimated one period ahead risk-free rate on the boom probability and a constant, we find a regression coefficient of 1.9. That is, moving from a situation where agents know for sure that they are in a recession to one where they would know for sure that they are in a boom entails a increase in the annualized 3M risk-free rate of 1.9 percentage points. We compute the model's predicted interest rate using the method described in the appendix. Table 2 collects the predicted spread between the boom and recession interest rate. The average predicted interest rate is given in parenthesis. From the table, it is clear that the risk-free rate is determined mainly by the EIS parameter (ψ), with only limited variation with the coefficient of risk aversion (γ). The empirical spread over the business cycle is well matched for ψ = 1.3 so we choose this value for our baseline calibration.
Results

Reduction in consumption uncertainty
Knowledge on the state of the economy translates in utility through less uncertainty about future consumption levels. Figure 2 illustrates how such knowledge translates into better forecasts. Plotted are expected future consumption levels (measured as the increase in log consumption relative to the current level) for the next three quarters. The solid lines in both subplots give the expectation of a consumer who has no particular information on current state of the economy and bases the forecast on the ergodic state probabilities. The shaded area gives a one standard deviation bound for this forecast. Forecasts given state certainty are indicated by the bold dashed lines in each subplot. Being in a boom translates in a higher expected consumption level for all future period. The difference between this forecast and that made by the ignorant consumer is increasing with the horizon, but at a decreasing rate as the state forecast converges with the horizon to the ergodic state probabilities. The one standard deviation bound on the forecast is given by the thin dashed lines. Conversely, being in a recession translates into sharply lower expected consumption levels for all future periods. The difference in expectations from the unconditional case is more pronounced, reflecting the lower incidence of the recession state in the population.
As the figure suggests, knowing the state of the economy can yield significant forecasting gains, especially if this state happens to be a recession. Moreover, these gains are increasing with the forecasting horizon. The average Root-Mean-Square Error (RMSE) of the forecast under full information is 10% lower than the one when no information is available. (At the longer horizon of 1 and 2 years ahead, it is 12% and 18% lower, respectively.) Most of this reduction comes from the benefit of being able to identify recessions correctly. When looking at recession states only, the fall in the RMSE is almost twice as high.
At the lower limit (in our setup), consumers will have available the endowment growth rate for estimating the state of the economy. Hence, the relevant question for measuring the cost of business cycle uncertainty is how much additional uncertainty does the lack of firm knowledge introduce for such consumers. We estimated this by running a 100'000 period Monte Carlo simulation of our model economy. In each period, consumers beliefs were updated according to the filter presented in section 2. As it turns out, such business cycle uncertainty does not translate in a large predictability loss. For most horizons, the average RMSE is roughly only 3% higher than under certainty. Most of this loss occures in recessions, since they are on average shorter and hence harder to detect. Figure 3 shows how much consumption agents would be willing to give up to learn the current state of the economy for different levels of uncertainty for both consumption measures. The left hand panel gives the values when we use PCE as our consumption measure; the right hand when we use NDS. Two measures of cost are provided. The solid lines show the amount of consumption drop that the agents would be willing to incur to always have a perfect signal on the state of the economy available. This is not to be confused with a one-time payment, since a consumption drop would have a permanent effect on future consumption growth rates through our process assumptions. An alternative measure is how much current consumption agents would be willing to give up to learn the current state of the economy with certainty, this cost is marked with dashed lines. If they have very strong priors about the state, i.e. if they are on either on the ends of the horizontal axes, such a signal would be superfluous and they would not be willing to pay for it. This is not true for the first measure: if business cycle uncertainty is permanently removed, consumers benefit from the knowledge that there will also be no uncertainty in future periods.
Implied utility gain
As we see from the figure, the cost of business cycle uncertainty is higher when we rely on PCE as our consumption measure than when we use NDS. This reflects the larger difference between the mean boom and recession growth rates of the two aggregates.
The average cost of business cycle uncertainty depends, of course, on how much uncertainty there is on average. Figure 4 shows the ergodic dis- 
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tribution of state beliefs given only the information available in each of the two consumption measures. Both densities are right-skewed, reflecting the higher incidence of booms in the population. The larger difference between the mean boom and recession growth rates of PCE makes it a better measure for detecting the state of the economy. This advantaged is balanced somewhat by its larger volatility. In sum, the larger degree of uncertainty under NDS is dominated by its lower cost. Table 3 reports the results for the cost of business cycle uncertainty for a range of alternative parameters. All numbers are reported for a quarterly time discount factor (β) of 0.9925 and are given in basis points. The first number reported is the average amount of consumption that agents would be willing to permanently give up to move to an economy where they would always know the state of the economy. Even for our baseline calibration, where agents have a strong preference for early resolution of uncertainty it does not exceed 0.1 percent of current consumption.
2 The second set of numbers, given in parenthesis, gives the maximum amount of consumption a household would be willing to give up to learn only the current state of the economy. Interestingly, the two numbers are of similar magnitude. As expected, the numbers are increasing as we move along any path from the north-west corner of the table (where γ < 1/ψ) to the south-east corner (where γ > 1/ψ). This reflects a shift to an ever greater preference for early resolution of uncertainty.
Bliss in ignorance after all? Slow learning
The results above indicates that only modest utility gains can be achieved from trying to tweak out information from other sources than the endowment growth rates per se. If information processing is costly, it might not be worthwhile for a consumer to actually invest a lot of effort in this.
Given this finding, it seems natural to ask what is the benefit of processing even the information that is given in the endowment growth rates. As it turns out, there might be quite significant utility gains from not processing even this information.
As a first attempt to answer this question, we look at the case of a consumer who is extremely reluctant in processing information: instead of actually updating his beliefs according to whatever news are available, he chooses Reported is the size of the permanent drop in consumption which agents would be willing to incur to avoid all business cycle uncertainty. The numbers in parenthesis is the maximum amount of current consumption agents would be willing to give up to learn the current state of the economy (both measured in basis points) for the two consumption measures. to use the unconditional boom and recession probabilities for forming his expectations about future consumption paths. Table 4 gives the utility gains (or losses) that such slow learning yields for the consumer. Analogously to the last section, we measure it as the increase in consumption necessary to make the consumer indifferent between: (1) learning the state with certainty (but enjoy higher consumption) and (2) not updating the state beliefs at all (but stay at the current consumption level).
The results show that there are significant utility gains from not caring to update the state beliefs. These gains increase as we move toward the lower right corner of the table. This is quite surprising, because a consumer who's preferences can be represented by parameter constellations such as those in the lower right corner has an extreme preference for early resolution of uncertainty. Moreover, in the section above we demonstrated that these very consumers gain from more precise knowledge about the state of the economy. How can these, seemingly contradictory, findings be reconciled? The key is to realize that endowment growth rates and external signals have quite different relations with consumption-the variable which ultimately generates utility.
Consider first the information in the endowment growth rate. Processing the information embedded in it will lead consumers to lower their forecasted future growth rates, and hence their expected utility, whenever their current consumption grew by less than expected. These are just the times when utility is low in the first place. Likewise, a high consumption growth rate, and hence a high period utility will coincide with an upward revision of future consumption growth rates and hence higher expected future utility. Consumers who are indifferent about the timing of resolution of uncertainty will not care either way, since current consumption and expected future consumption are additively separable in their utility function. But such consumers which we usually think of as having a preference for early resolution will suffer if they on average get bad news about the future in low consumption states. Their utility function is not additively separable in current and future consumption and a positive covariance between current and expected consumption would lower their utility level. Now consider the case of the external signal. Since consumers are already extracting all information from the endowment growth rates, the information it contains will be uncorrelated with the current period consumption. As such, it is pure information, and it's value is only determined by whether agents have a preference for early resolution in the typical sense.
The stylized three period example in figure 5 might give some intuition: as in the example depicted in section 2, there are a set of possible paths for future consumption and from the perspective of a power utility maximizer, it does not matter whether beliefs are updated in period 2. The only thing that counts is the probability distribution of consumption for each point in the future. Now consider the utility of a consumer who has our benchmark utility parameters (ψ = 1.3; γ = 25) and has the choice between committing today to either update his beliefs or not in the second period. In the graph, utility with updating is denoted by U and utility without updating byÛ .
In the last period, a consumer's utility will be independent of prior expectations, so both utility measures will be equal. If we are in the high consumption state in period 2, updating expectations will lead to higher expected utility; the opposite holds for the low consumption state. This is trivial. What is interesting is that the average period 2 utility under updating is lower than under not updating. The reason for this is the same non-linearity of the utility that generated a preference for early resolution in the first place. For period 1, the higher average period 2 utility when not updating translates in a higher utility under ignorance.
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated and quantified the cost of business cycle uncertainty in a simple setup where the economy switches between booms and recessions at random intervals. Firm knowledge about the prevailing state of the economy enables better forecasts of future consumption levels and hence reduces consumption uncertainty, a boon for such consumers who prefers to have uncertainty resolved as early as possible.
We found two apparently contradictory results: (1) consumers experience a (modest) utility gain when they are provided with information beyond what is already incorporated in their endowment process; (2) There are large utility gains from either committing to a slow learning rule or assuming a simplified model for the economy. These results were reconciled by noting the different mechanism behind each of the results: in the second case, ignorance removes some of the positive covariance between realized consumption and expected future consumption. For preferences such as those of our baseline calibration this leads to a utility gain. In the first case, the information is orthogonal to the current consumption and adding more of it does not change the covariance between realized consumption and expected utility. Here the normal results obtains: consumers with a preference for early resolution of uncertainty will also benefit from more information.
As we see it, ours is but a first attempt to quantify the cost of business cycle uncertainty. The low benefits we find are due to the only modestly better consumption growth forecasts that firm knowledge about state of the economy allows us. More refined regime specifications than our stylized boom-recession framework would probably yield higher costs.
A Computing the implied risk-free rate
For solving for the risk-free rate, we rely on one of the key results of Epstein and Zin (1989) , which is that the stochastic discount factor can be expressed as:
where R e,t+1 is the equilibrium gross return to aggregate wealth between t and t + 1. As usual, the gross risk-free rate is given by the inverse of the expected value of the stochastic discount factor, or 
